This paper provides robust estimates of the impact of both product and labor market regulations on unemployment using data from 24 European countries over the period 1998-2013.
Introduction
With almost 20 million people 1 unemployed in 2016, unemployment is and remains at the core of the economic and social debate in Europe. The financial crisis in 2008 and the sovereign debt crisis which followed in Europe in 2013 significantly raised the unemployment rate.
Unemployment rates are particularly high in some countries: as much as 23.6% in Greece and 19.6% in Spain in 2016 compared to 8. 4% and 8.2%, respectively, in 2007 . Since standard macroeconomic tools such as monetary and fiscal policies are being already used and have their limits, structural reforms appear as a crucial ingredient for boosting economic growth and employment. This paper contributes to the debate by evaluating the effect of product and labor market deregulation on the unemployment rate.
The economy-wide product market regulation (PMR) index computed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is used to estimate the level of regulation in 24 European countries 2 over the period [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] . The indicator covers all sectors and can be broken down by type of regulation thanks to the bottom-up approach used to compute it. State controls, barriers to entrepreneurship, and barriers to trade can thus be assessed separately to find the most relevant deregulation policy to put in place to tackle unemployment.
Labor market regulation is analyzed through the OECD employment protection legislation (EPL) index, which can also be unbundled by type of contract (regular or temporary).
The timing of structural reform implementation can be directly linked to the economic environment, leading to an endogeneity issue. Standard econometric methodologies would then provide biased estimates since the change in the unemployment rate can be due to a cyclical component rather than to the implementation of product and labor market reforms. We control for the potential endogeneity of PMR and EPL by using a fixed-effect regression model, where lags of the difference with respect to the country means for the endogenous variables are used as instruments. Results show that a reduction in PMR reduces the unemployment rate whereas a drop in EPL increases it. Moreover, econometric tests do not support the existence of PMR and EPL endogeneity.
The increase in unemployment does not affect all categories of workers equally. Young workers, less educated individuals, and to a lesser extent women constitute vulnerable groups.
different types of deregulations (PMR and EPL) and on different types of workers. We contribute significantly to the literature by analyzing a longer period of time than previous studies which notably allows us to control for the potential endogeneity of the regulatory variables and to obtain more efficient estimates. We also add to existing evidence by considering subcomponents of product and labor market reforms as well as by analyzing different groups of workers.
Section 3 presents the database and defines PMR and EPL indices. It also describes which reforms took place in the past and analyzes the bivariate relationship between each index and the unemployment rate. Empirical results of the regression analysis are summarized in Section 4. We distinguish by type of deregulation as well as by type of workers. The last section concludes by emphasizing some limits of the study and proposes avenues for further research.
Literature review
Unemployment movements as well as heterogeneities across countries can largely be explained by interactions between macroeconomic shocks and economic institutions (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000) . PMR and EPL are part of the equation. The first section is devoted to theoretical and empirical findings regarding the labor impact of PMR and EPL. The second section summarizes the labor market situation, and in particular the unemployment rate, of different categories of workers and presents a survey of the literature on the labor impact of PMR and EPL for vulnerable groups.
Theoretical and empirical findings on the impact of product and labor market (de)regulation on labor market outcomes
In the theoretical literature, product market deregulation is usually defined as a reduction in barriers to entry or an increase in competition. Ebell and Haefke (2003) studied the dynamic relationship between product market entry regulation and equilibrium unemployment and wages. They assume matching frictions, monopolistic competition in the goods market, multiworker firms, individual wage bargaining, and barriers to entry. They find a positive impact of product market deregulation on labor market outcomes: a reduction in entry barriers in the model brings down unemployment and pushes up wages. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) distinguish between short-run and long-run effects. In their model, a reduction in entry costs has no effect in the short run since the number of firms is assumed to be fixed. The positive effect of deregulation comes only in the long run when new firms enter the market, implying a higher elasticity of demand and a lower markup. This in turn leads to lower unemployment and higher wages. Cacciatore et al. (2012) study the macroeconomic effects of a reduction in barriers to entry using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. They assume endogenous producer entry, equilibrium unemployment, and costly job creation and destruction. In line with Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) , their results show a long-term effect but no short-term effect.
The story is different if an increase in product market competition is considered. In the Blanchard and Giavazzi model, firms are then facing more elastic demand associated with a lower markup in the short run. This, in turn, leads to both an increase in real wages and a fall in unemployment. In the long run, profits come back to their initial level, as do unemployment and wages. Using a general equilibrium model, Gersbach and Schniewind (2001) evaluate the final effect of promoting product market competition, without any distinction between shortrun and long-run impact. They find a decline in the aggregate unemployment rate (although the unemployment rate can rise in some sectors). Amable and Gatti (2001) consider an increase in product market competition in a model of monopolistic competition with an endogenous determination of worker flows in and out of unemployment. Product market reform boosts the hiring rate as well as the separation rate, which can lead to a negative effect on unemployment depending on wage rigidities in the labor market.
The empirical findings are in line with the theory and point to a decrease in unemployment (Amable et al. 2011 , Bassanini and Duval 2006a , De Serres et al. 2012 , Griffith et al. 2007 ) and an increase in employment (Berger and Danninger 2007 , Boeri et al. 2000 , Fiori et al. 2007 , Nicoletti et al. 2001 , Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2005 if the product market is deregulated. Gal and Hijzen (2016) and Bordon et al. (2016) evaluate the impact over time and find a positive and increasing effect in the long run. The methodologies and results are summarized in Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) analyze the nonagricultural business employment rate (excluding public employment) and find a negative and statistically significant effect of public ownership. This implies that employment shifts, at least partially, from business to public sector as a result of an increase in public ownership. Regarding barriers to entrepreneurship and barriers to trade, the evaluated impact is always negative: more regulation would mean less employment (Fiori et al. 2007, Berger and Danninger 2007) even if the effect is sometimes not statistically significant (Boeri et al. 2000) .
Labor market factors, that is, union density, employment protection, replacement rate, and active labor market policies, are also at the core of unemployment researches. In this paper, we are particularly interested in EPL which aims to protect workers against abusive dismissals and provides (financial) compensation for the income loss associated with dismissals.
Flexibility of employment protection is considered to be essential for rapid adjustments in the workforce to changing economic conditions and to reallocate labor toward more productive activities.
In theory, more stringent EPL is modeled through an increase in the cost of firing staff.
A priori, labor demand is thus negatively affected: firms reduce their hiring rates and unemployment increases (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 1996, Bassanini and Duval 2006b) . To compensate for higher dismissal costs, firms offer lower wages. However, severance pay can be seen as an additional income for workers. If workers are risk neutral, it does not matter if the income is coming from wages or severance pay. Wages adjust, and the unemployment rate is not affected (Burda 1992) . On the other hand, as the hiring rate declines, the average time job seekers spend in unemployment before finding a new job increases and unemployment becomes more costly. Workers are more willing to accept lower wages to maintain their jobs, and labor market equilibrium is restored (Blanchard 1999). As a result, employment protection lowers labor turnover (both hiring and layoffs) and extends the duration of unemployment. The net effect on the aggregate unemployment rate remains ambiguous.
Labor market deregulation through less stringent EPL can provide different results. In the short run, it leads to lower wages and thus higher profits for firms. It either has no effect on unemployment (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003) or initially increases layoffs more than it creates jobs and thus increases unemployment (Cacciatore et al. 2016 ). In the long run, higher profits attract new firms which hire new workers and thus the unemployment rate drops. (2002) find that a large part of unemployment movements was mainly due to country-specific effects rather than institutional factors such as EPL.
In sum, the empirics do not provide unambiguous results that could justify prescriptions for labor market deregulation. A detailed summary of the results and the estimation methods are provided in Table 1 .
Employment protection reforms can be implemented either on regular or on temporary contracts and thus have different impacts on labor market outcomes. Bassanini and Duval (2006a) The difference between the levels of regulation for both types of contracts can also be crucial in determining the potential variation of unemployment. A stricter protection for permanent contracts compared to temporary contracts could raise the share of temporary contracts.
However, this conclusion also depends on the initial level of regulation. If employment protection is initially strict for both types of contracts, a weakening in rules for temporary contracts would raise the share of temporary contracts (Boeri et al. 2000) . The reform of temporary contracts in Spain in 1984 is a good illustration since the use of fixed-term contracts dramatically increased from 10% at the beginning of the 1980s to 35% in the 1990s.
Vulnerable groups of workers and the potential effect of PMR and EPL
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Women, young workers, old workers, and the low-educated people are considered as vulnerable groups in terms of employment. A large share of those types of workers is either inactive or unemployed (Figure 1 ). The unemployment literature has widely studied the reasons behind their weaker attachment to the labor market.
Unemployment among young people appears to be one of the most highly sensitive variables in the labor market. It is directly linked to gross domestic product (GDP) growth: the youth unemployment rate falls during booms and rises during recessions. In addition, young workers are frequently mismatched in their employment (Shimer 2001) . The employment process thus implies considerable searching and job changing before settling into a more or less permanent contract. In 2016, on average across European countries, 45% of the 15-24-year-old salaried workers had a temporary contract compared to 14% of the category aged 25-49 years.
Job match improves with age, and older workers are often protected against job loss by seniority rights because they have built-up skills through experience. Despite job protection and the lower average unemployment rate, the possibilities of finding a new job decline with age. The net effect is that the long-term unemployment rate is higher for older workers. In 2016, 60% of the unemployed workers over 50 years had been disconnected from the labor market for more than 12 months in Europe. This rate was 28% for the age group of 15-24 years and 47% for the age group of 25-49 years.
4 All averages in this section correspond to the average for the 24 European countries considered, namely 21 countries from the EU (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom) + Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. 
Source: EC.
In spite of the rise in their participation rate, from 52% in 1998 to 59% in 2016, there are still less women in the labor market than men, with a gap in the activity rate of 11 percentage points in 2016. As emphasized by Jaumotte (2004) , education, the functioning of labor markets, and cultural attitudes (access to childcare, parental leave, integration) remain important determinants of female participation. Analyzing 18 OECD countries over the period 1980 -2007 , Thévenon (2013 finds that childcare services, maternity leave, and tax policies remain the most important drivers of increased female participation in the labor market.
Whatever the age or gender considered, unemployment is concentrated among those with the lowest level of education. Moreover, a large part of the increase in unemployment in Europe is due to a rise in joblessness among the low-skilled workers. The reason is a fall in demand for low-skilled workers. Competition from countries with low labor costs and technological progress are two factors often cited to explain labor demand shrinkage. However, as emphasized by Dolado et al. (2000) , raising the educational attainment of the labor force does not always solve the unemployment problem unless other labor market rigidities are reduced.
Among the wide range of literature on product and labor market regulations, only very few articles have considered their impact on the unemployment rate for different categories of individuals. Gal and Theising (2015) point out that low-educated people, the young, and the elderly tend to be more affected by structural reforms. They study EPL in particular and find an heterogeneous impact on various segments of the population. In their analysis, stricter regulation reduces employment for women and low-educated workers and pushes up employment for highly educated individuals. Bassanini and Duval (2006b) also find contrasting results depending on the type of workers, with a decrease in employment for young workers but an increase for older workers. As emphasized in the OECD (2004) Employment Outlook, by reducing turnover, employment protection reduces the job prospects for those with relatively weak attachment to the labor market, such as young workers and women. Those opposing effects may explain the difficulty in finding a robust impact of EPL on aggregate unemployment since the impact depends on the composition of the working-age population in terms of skills and demographic characteristics.
PMR seems to affect women more than men. Studying the impact of PMR on the employment rate for 20 OECD countries over the period 1982 -2003 , Bassanini and Duval (2006b estimate a statistically significant negative effect for women but no statistically significant impact for men.
De Serres et al. (2012) provide similar results by studying the unemployment rate: a stricter regulation implies a higher unemployment rate for women but not for men. Those two articles also find that the impact depends on the age of workers: PMR affects older workers positively, through an increase in their employment rate (Bassanini and Duval 2006b ), but affects young people negatively, through an increase in the unemployment rate (De Serres et al. 2012) . Source: OECD. PMR, product market regulation.
and France (+0.03). On the contrary, other countries substantially reduced employment protection: the largest reform was in Portugal (-1.28), followed by the Slovak Republic (-0.63),
Greece (-0.48), and Spain (-0.40).
The indicators for three types of EPL weakened over the period. The largest reduction in the index is observed for temporary contracts, with a decrease of 0.23, and it was also A high level of regulation in product and labor markets is not always associated with a high unemployment rate ( Figure 6 ). Germany, for instance, had the third lowest unemployment rate in 2013, while its level of employment protection was the highest. In terms of regulation in the product market, Switzerland was the fifth most highly regulated country but had the second lowest unemployment rate. There are also some counterexamples. The highest unemployment rate was found in Greece, which has the most highly regulated product market.
Portugal also had a high unemployment rate (third rank) together with a high level of employment protection (fifth rank). Differences in unemployment rates can thus reflect institutional and economic features, but are also impacted by macroeconomic shocks. Countries with high unemployment rates tend to be countries which were more affected by the economic crisis. 
Empirical results
To explore the institutional determinants of unemployment, in particular PMR and EPL, we first estimate the following equation:
where u is the unemployment rate in country i and year t; PMR represents the PMR indicator;
EPL is the EPL index; X groups control variables for other labor market policies (net replacement rate and union density); Z is a vector of control variables for macroeconomic factors (GDP gap, inflation, and labor productivity); g t is a time fixed effect and e it is the error term.
Control variables have been chosen depending on the availability of the data and based on previous research. Together with EPL, union density and the replacement rate are important factors for the unemployment rate. Higher union density raises the bargaining power of workers, hence increases wages which in turn reduces the number of workers hired and thus increases the unemployment rate (Nickell and Andrews, 1983) . The replacement rate (unemployment benefits received when not working relative to wages earned when employed) can also directly influence unemployment. Higher unemployment benefits put upward pressure on Estimating and testing a model using ordinary least squares (OLS) involve some issues related to the use of time series cross-section data. Our data are characterized by a limited number of countries and a restricted period of estimation, which makes standard panel data estimation procedures problematic. By simply applying pooled ordinary least squares method, the coefficient variability can be underestimated by 50% or more (Beck and Katz 1995). To deal with standard error overconfidence, they propose a new estimation method: the panel-corrected standard errors. By applying OLS with modified standard errors, panel-corrected standard errors take into account panel heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation of the error terms. This methodology is thus applied to our standard regression.
Some heterogeneity across countries can be omitted or not fully captured by our explanatory variables. To control for this potential bias and to account for the specific characteristics of countries, all variables are estimated in difference with respect to the country mean (country fixed-effect regression).
Potential endogeneity of product market and labor market reforms constitutes another estimation issue. In fact, the effects of structural reforms may be endogenous to the economic environment in which reforms are conducted. Usually, in such cases, an instrumental variable regression is estimated, using the lagged values of the endogenous variables as instruments. To specify the optimal number of lags, a weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F-stat) and an overidentification test (Hansen J-stat) are conducted. The tests suggest that a lag of 2 years can be used.
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Depending on when the structural reform is implemented, the estimated impact can be biased. For example, the effect on the unemployment rate of a reform conducted shortly before an economic recovery is difficult to distinguish from the effect of the recovery itself. In this case, endogeneity induces an upward bias of the estimates. The contrary is true if the reform is implemented shortly before a downturn. Interestingly, the endogeneity tests contradict the assumption that effects of structural reforms are endogenous to the economic environment (the p-value is above the 0.10 bound). This finding is in line with Bassanini and Duval (2009) and Fiori et al. (2007) who also find no evidence of reverse causality from unemployment to institutions. This absence of endogeneity could be explained by the fact that the regression estimates the impact of EPL and PMR level in year t on the level of unemployment rate on year t. Since structural reforms can take time to be implemented, it is reasonable to assume that the unemployment rate does not influence the current level of regulation in product and labor markets. In this case, the fixed-effect regression is unbiased by the business cycle and thus constitutes the best estimation that can be made. Since specifications for different types of regulations and different types of workers do not provide different results regarding the endogeneity issue, the analysis presented in the next sections focuses on the fixed-effect regressions.
Baseline regressions
The baseline regression using year and country fixed effects provides a positive coefficient for PMR equal to 3.45 (Table 2, Coefficients of EPL and PMR remain statistically significant and of the same sign. Moreover, the evidence of no endogeneity remains for all estimations, even for the exactly identified model (lag of 1 year). The complete results are given in Table S1 . 9 See Table S2. of the EPL index), the predicted unemployment rate should increase by 0.4 percentage point.
Between 2008 and 2013, the EPL index fell on average by 0.13 point which is associated with a predicted increase in the unemployment rate by 0.9 percentage point. Deregulation in the labor market took place in the very last period of our sample, so that the estimated impact could be a short-run effect of deregulation. This result is in line with the findings of Cacciatore et al. (2016) and Bordon et al. (2016) who show that deregulating the labor market could be detrimental to unemployment in the short run while a positive impact (i.e., a reduction in the unemployment rate) occurs only in the long run. This result could have an incidence on the decision of policymakers to implement or not a labor market reform. Usually, as they have a defined mandate of few years, they will be less inclined to implement labor market reforms. This statement could explain why we do not observe a clear trend in deregulation for the labor market.
To test this hypothesis, we excluded from the sample countries which implemented the largest labor market reforms at the end of the period, namely Portugal, Greece, Spain, and Italy (Table 3) . Although the coefficient of PMR remains the same, even if slightly lower, the effect of employment protection on the unemployment rate is reversed, that is, deregulating the labor market is now beneficial to reduce the unemployment rate. As this specification should better capture the long-run effect of labor market deregulation, results confirm the hypothesis of a negative short-run effect but a positive long-run effect.
Another potential explanation of the negative relationship between EPL and the unemployment rate is interaction between labor market and PMR. Most countries deregulated their product markets, which led to a low PMR index, ranging from 0.91 (the Netherlands) to 1.74 (Greece) in 2013. According to Amable et al. (2011) , with low levels of PMR, employment protection yields a positive and statistically significant effect on employment (and thus potentially a reduction in the unemployment rate). Other papers (Fiori et al. 2007 , Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2005 , Griffith et al. 2007 show similar results. Reducing PMR is more beneficial in terms of employment when the labor market is highly regulated. Adding an interaction term in our ), *significant at 90%, **significant at 95%, ***significant at 99%. EPL, employment protection legislation; PMR, product market regulation.
baseline regression confirms results provided by Amable et al. (2011) : deregulating the labor market is detrimental to unemployment only when PMR level is already low. However, as long as we exclude Portugal, Greece, Spain, and Italy from the regression, there is no longer statistically significant impact for the interaction term, while the individual effects of EPL and PMR remain. The estimated interaction between both types of deregulation could then also be a short-run effect rather than a long-run effect.
Regressions by type of PMR
The positive and statistically significant coefficient of PMR can hide opposite effects. As shown in Table 4 , the regressions taking the three types of PMR into account support this statement.
Government interventions through public ownership and involvement in business operations
do not appear to be detrimental to the unemployment rate. A decrease in state control by the average level of reform observed during the period (-0.32) is associated with a predicted rise in the unemployment rate by 0.6 percentage point. This effect seems to come from price controls and command and controls rather than public ownership. Although the literature on this topic is contradicting, some papers also find state controls to be beneficial to employment (Fiori et al. 2007) Note: (Standard errors), **significant at 95%, ***significant at 99%. EPL, employment protection legislation; ES, Spain; GR, Greece; IT, Italy; PMR, product market regulation; PT, Portugal..
Table 4
Impact of different types of PMR on the unemployment rate
(8)
Employment protection 1.39*** -0.60 -6.16*** -5.85*** -6.30*** -7.67*** 0.15 -1.98*** -6.21*** -6.12*** -7.20*** -8.32*** Note: (Standard errors), *significant at 90%, **significant at 95%, ***significant at 99%. C&C, command and control; EPL, employment protection legislation; PMR, product market regulation.
Regressions by type of EPL
The EPL can be divided by types of contract (regular or temporary). For regular contracts, employment protection can refer to individual or collective dismissal costs. We estimate the specified unemployment equation for the three types of EPL. Results are presented in Table 5 .
Although the aggregate EPL index has a negative coefficient, the subdivision shows that this is only reflected in individual dismissal costs and regulation on temporary contracts. The largest effect occurs for individual dismissals. Less stringent protection (a fall in the index by on average 0.08) is associated with an increase in the predicted unemployment rate by 0.7 percentage point.
To a lesser extent, a lower rate of regulation in the use of temporary contracts (-0.07 on average) would also raise the unemployment rate by 0.1 percentage point. Regulation of temporary contracts includes rules for fixed-term contracts (valid cases for the use of fixedterm contracts, maximum number of successive fixed-term contracts, and maximum cumulated duration of successive fixed-term contracts) as well as rules for temporary work agency employment (types of work for which temporary work agency employment is legal, restrictions on the number of renewals, maximum cumulated duration, and equal treatment of regular and agency workers at the user firm).
Deregulation in EPL for collective redundancies, on the contrary, appears to reduce unemployment. However, decrease in the rigidity of rules for collective redundancies (such as specific requirements, delays, and costs to employers) has been very limited over the period, meaning that the average level of reform (-0.03) is predicted to have induced only a slightly reduction in the unemployment rate by 0.05 percentage point. 
Employment protection 1) Individual dismissals -0.00 -1.14*** -8.52*** -8.30*** -10.09*** -10.27*** (0.29) (0.28) (1.22) (1.72) (2.13) (2.25) 2) Collective dismissals 1.31*** 0.20 1.62** 1.77** 3.10*** 3.08*** (0.28) (0.14) (0.73) (0.87) (1.03) (1.03) 3) Temporary employment 0.48*** 0.47*** -1.22*** -1.49*** -1.60*** -1.54*** (0 Note: (Standard errors), **significant at 95%, ***significant at 99%. EPL, employment protection legislation; PMR, product market regulation.
Since aggregate results were different when excluding some countries, we also tested the estimation of subcomponents of EPL without Portugal, Greece, Spain, and Italy. Interestingly, coefficients of individual dismissals and temporary employment become not statistically significant, such that different level of regulation has no incidence on the unemployment rate. The only remaining effect is coming from collective dismissals which keep a positive and highly statistically significant coefficient. In other words, even after controlling for countries which implemented the largest labor market reforms during the period, reducing protection against collective dismissals still remains beneficial to decrease the unemployment rate.
10
Regressions by types of workers
Based on the unemployment rates for different categories of workers, we estimated the impact of PMR and EPL using fixed-effects regression. The results, presented in Table 6 , show the effects in similar directions across types of workers. All estimated regressions provide a negative coefficient for EPL, meaning that deregulation raises the unemployment rate and a positive coefficient for PMR which implies that deregulation reduces the unemployment rate. The magnitude of the coefficients differs. Analysis by gender shows a larger effect of structural reforms on women: a reduction by 1 standard deviation of PMR reduces the female unemployment rate by 1.7 percentage points against only 1.5 percentage points for men. In the case of employment protection reforms, a decrease by 1 standard deviation raises the unemployment rate by 3.3 percentage points for women and 2.8
percentage points for men. Nevertheless, for both structural reforms, coefficients for men and women are not statistically different for men and women.
Subdivision of workers by age indicates that the impact of deregulation in EPL on the unemployment rate is larger for young workers. Reduction in the strictness of employment protection increases the unemployment rate by 6 percentage points for 15-24-year-old workers, against 3.2 percentage points for 25-49-year-old workers, and 2.8 percentage points for workers older than 50 years. Although young workers are the most affected, coefficients between the two other age categories are not significantly different. Moreover, no statistical differences are observed in terms of product market deregulation.
The three levels of education are equally impacted by reforms in EPL (the coefficients are not statistically different). Deregulation by 1 standard deviation pushes up the unemployment rate by 2.7 percentage points on average. The effect of product market reforms 10 See Table S3 11 Endogeneity tests also show no evidence of reverse causality for different types of workers. As a result, only the fixedeffect estimation is presented in this section. does not differ between low-and middle-educated individuals either, but is significantly lower for highly educated workers. Although deregulation in product market reduces the unemployment rate by 2.2 for low-educated workers and by 1.6 percentage points for middle-educated people, the unemployment rate falls by only 0.6 percentage points for highly educated workers.
Results on subcomponents of regulation for different types of workers provide similar results as the aggregate effect (Table 7) . Moreover, coefficients for all workers and for all subcomponents remain of the same sign than the baseline regression with the total unemployment rate. In terms of gender, the magnitude of the effect is equivalent for all types of regulation except for state control for which the effect is greater among men than among women. However, the difference is significant only at 90%. The decomposition by age shows that results on the aggregate EPL index hold only for individual dismissals and not for collective dismissals and temporary employment. For those two types of regulation, results are not statistically different for the three age categories. In terms of PMR, younger workers are slightly more impacted than older workers for state controls and barriers to trade and investment. Finally, the analysis by level of education shows that results for the aggregate index hide some opposing effects. For individual and collective dismissals, middle-educated workers are significantly more impacted than highly educated workers. On the other hand, regulation on temporary contracts has a higher effect on low-educated workers. Regarding PMR, we see that highly educated workers are significantly less affected by all types of regulation.
Although, on the aggregate index, low-and middle-educated workers are equally impacted, the effect of barriers to entrepreneurship seems to slightly affect more low-educated workers than middle-educated workers.
Conclusion
This paper provides a robust estimation of the impact of both product and labor market regulations on unemployment using data from 24 European countries over the period 1998-2013.
We contribute significantly to the literature by analyzing a longer period of time than previous studies which notably allows us to control for the potential endogeneity of the regulatory variables and to obtain more efficient estimates. We also add to existing evidence by considering subcomponents of product and labor market reforms as well as by analyzing different groups of workers.
Controlling for country fixed effects, endogeneity, and various covariates, results show that product market deregulation overall reduces the unemployment rate. By implementing the average level of the reform that occurred in the period 1998-2013, a country could decrease its unemployment rate (other things being equal) by 1 percentage point. This finding is robust to all specifications and in line with theoretical predictions. The overall positive effect of product market deregulation can be decomposed into the effect of deregulation regarding state controls, barriers to entrepreneurship, and barriers to trade. Although a reduction in barriers to entrepreneurship and trade implies a decline in the unemployment rate, the reverse occurs for state controls. The estimations suggest that reducing government involvement in business operations (such as price controls and command and control policies) tends to push up the unemployment rate. the trend in reducing regulations is less strong in labor markets. Deregulation took place in the very last period of the sample, so that the estimated impact could be a short-run effect of deregulation. To test this hypothesis, we excluded countries which implemented the largest employment protection reforms during the last 5 years from the sample. Although the coefficient of PMR remains the same, even if slightly lower, the effect of employment protection on the unemployment rate is reversed and statistically significant. In line with recent empirical and theoretical findings, this result shows that deregulating the labor market could be detrimental to unemployment in the short run while a positive impact (i.e., a reduction in the unemployment rate) occurs only in the long run. Analysis by sub-indicators shows that reducing protection against collective dismissals helps in reducing the unemployment rate. Moreover, this finding remains true even after controlling for countries which implemented the largest labor market reforms.
As regards endogeneity, diagnoses tests contradict the assumption that effects of structural reforms are endogenous to the economic environment. In line with some previous findings, the absence of endogeneity could be explained by the fact that regressions estimate the effect of the regulation level in year t on the level of unemployment rate during the same year. Since structural reforms can take time to be implemented, it is reasonable to assume that the unemployment rate does not influence the current level of regulation in product and labor markets.
This paper also goes further in the analysis by distinguishing unemployed workers by age, gender, and education. For all types of workers, the sign of the coefficients remains the same as for the aggregate unemployment rate, namely positive for PMR and negative for EPL. The magnitude of the impact differs, however. Younger workers (aged between 15 and 24 years) are more impacted by labor market regulations than workers aged 25 years and older. The effect is approximately two times bigger. Analysis by level of education shows a larger effect of product market deregulation on the unemployment rate of low-and middle-educated workers than for highly educated workers. The effect of EPL, however, does not differ by educational attainment.
Finally, men and women are almost equally impacted by both types of reforms.
Further research could go in different directions. First of all, this paper only considers the impact on the unemployment rate; it does not provide evidence about the effect on the employment or inactivity rates. A reduction in the unemployment rate can result from either a higher employment rate or a higher inactivity rate (when workers leave the labor force). The data do not make it possible to measure flows into and out of employment and into and out of the labor force. Second, another distinction that could be made in addition to the type of regulation and the type of workers is a sectoral analysis. It could also be interesting to evaluate which sectors are most affected by deregulation and see whether these are the sectors that are creating more jobs.
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